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ing a difficult time making her payments on the
property. fo~ .this reason; that she therefore· wanted
her attorney to do what was necessary in order to
get the payments up to date. In accordance with this
information the defendanf s attorney prepared a
notice of default on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and had the same served upon the· plaintiff at
her residence in .the State of Washington. In response to this service, the plaintiff came to Salt Lake
City and. had a conference with defendant's attorney,
after which it was determined how much was due
and owing on the contract; and plaintiff informed
defendant's attorney that she would. take care of
this matter within a very short time. Nothing was
ever done on it after this conference; whereupon
the plaintiff herein was served with a notice of repossession of the property in accordance with the
con tract between the two parties.
According to the file of this Ci;lSe, the plaintiff
thereafter contacted a Salt Lake. City attorney, and
on the 7th day of July,196l, commenced this action
by service of summons upon the defendant. the action concerning this property. The defendant, within
four or five days thereafter/ delivered the ~aid. summons and complaint to the office of her attorneyr
Norman Wade/ and requested that .the. attorney to.
protect her interest in the matter. These said ·papers
were inadvertently and mistakenly set .aside,. and
the attorney for the defendant herein ;,as under the
impression that an answer to ·the complaint had be~n
prepared and .filed w1thin the proper twenty-day
period. The a.ttorney believed that_ saicl· matter had
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been taken care of and that the defendant's interests
were protected. On the first day of September, 1961,
the defendant called her attorney, Norman Wade,
and asked him why her interests had not been protected, stating that a judgment had been entered
against her. Thereafter, the attorney checked with
the County Clerk's Office and confirmed this fact.
On t~e 11th day of September, 1961, defendant's
attorney filed a motion to set aside the default judgment along with an affidavit and answer to the case,
which papers are on file in the record. The said
motion to set asi<;le the default judgment was heard
by the Court and the Court denied the said motion;
and defendant herein appeals from the said Court's
denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
ITS DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
· MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEF:AULT JUDGMENT ON FILE HEREIN.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DISTRICT. COURT ERRED IN
ITS DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON FILE HEREIN.
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:ThE? defendanf s motion, as seen from the papers
in the file, was made in accordance with Rule 60(b)

of -the _Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as
follows:
~'Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidenc,e, Fraud, etc. On motion and
. up.on such. terms as are just the Court may, in
! !furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal
-<representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for. the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . . The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons 1, 2, 3 or 4, not more than three months
after judgment, order or proceeding was entered or
taken ... "

- 1:

As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in the
case of Echo Ney, Trustees, Wasatch Homes, Inc. vs.
G. T. Harrison and Alda J. Harrison, 299 Pac 2d, 114,
Rule 60(b), is substantially the same as former Section 104-14-40 Utah Code Annotated, 1943; and RevisedStatutes of 1898, Section 3005; and 2 Compiled
laws 1888, Section 3200; compiled laws of 1876, Section 1293, page 417; and therefore we have a substantial number of cases which have been tried in
Utah which give us the principles the Court should
keep in· mind in determining whether the default
judgment should be set aside or not. Federal Rule
60(b) is substantially ·the same as the Utah Rules of
C~vil ,Procedure 60(b). As a matter of fact, the Utah
Rul~ w:as taken from it. The only difference between
th.e' rules are these: (I) Utah Rules list as separate
reasons for setting aside the_ judgment, "(4) when,
for any cause, the summons in an action has not
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been personal! y served upon·· the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to
appear in said action.// Federal Rule· 60(b) has no
such separate reason listed. (2) For reasons 1/ 2/ 3
and 4/ Utah has a three month time limit while the
Federal Rule has a one year time limit. This motion
to set aside the judgment iri this case was made under thE? Section t of the Utah Rules .of Civil Procedure; and therefore the three-month time limit is
applicable. However, the !notion to set aside the
judgment was made well within· that three :inonths
time limit and was made as soon as was possible
after the defendant was aware that a default judgment had been taken against her.
The purpose of Hule 60(b) -when: it was first enacted/ along with its Utah predecessors/ (see above)/
and at the present time; is to give defendants who
have a valid and bono. fide defense against plaintiffs cause of action, relief from default judgment and
to allow cases to be tried on. their merits. Hund vs.
Ford/ 74 Utah 46/ 276 Pac.. 908; Echo Ney vs. G~ T.
Harrison and Alda J. Harrison/ -----· __ Utah --------~ 299
Pac. 2d 114; Warren vs. :Dixon Ranch Co;, ________ Utah
260 Pac 2d 741; Ellington vs. Miln; 18 F.R. Service, 606 .24 Case L 1953; Erich Rios Bridoux vs.
Eastern Airlines/ 214 F. 2d 207/ 19 F.R. Service 60b
x 29 Case 2/ 1951. See also the cases following.
••• , ____ 1

In the Utah vase of Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co.,
________ Utah ________ 260 Pac 2d 741/ the Utah Supreme
Court said:
1

"The allow:ance of a vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness
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of: enfoidng a judgment which may occur through
··procedural dificulties, the wrongs of opposing party,
()r misfortunes., which prevent the presentation of
a claim or defense. Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines the situations wherein a party
may berelieved from a final judgment ... "

In that same case the Court said further:
_"Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of jus- tice, and the Court will incline toward granting reief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may
have a hearing."

See also Hund vs. Ford, 74 Utah 46,276 Pac. 908.
In 1947 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
Eighth' Circuit, said in Assman vs. Fleming, 159 Fed.
2fict~332, 10 F.R. Service/ 60b .25/ Case l:
--_)

~

-: ·

-"It is elementary that courts favor the trial of causes
of action upon their merits, and hence judgment by
default or by confession are within the rule conferring power on courts to open or vacate their own
judgments."

t --

The court furthe-r said:

·:

r

"It must also be made to appear where the application is made by defendant that he has a meritorious
defense to the action. If, however, there are adequate allegations of a meritorious defense, prope·rly
verified, no counter showing will be received to
re.fute the alle·gations or merits presented by the
moving party."

In the case of Toza:r vs. harles A. Krause Milling Cq:, 179 Fed. 2d, 242, l95t 15 F.R. Service, 60b
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.24, Case 1, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit said:
"Matters should not be determined by de·fault judgments if it c.an be reasonably avoided. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the petition to set
aside the judgment so that cases may be dedded on
their merits."

In the case of 'In the Matter of the Estate of Cremidas' 18 Fed. Reserve Service 60b x 29, Case 3, 14
F.R.D. 15, Alaska, 1953, the Court held that relief from
judgments and orders is in the discretion of. the
Court and that discretion should ordinarily incline
toward granting reliet especially if no intervening
rights have attached in reliance upon judgment and
on actual injustice will ensue. Relief should be granted where a litigant has not been afforded an opportunity to have his case decided on the merits, as
where it is alleged and not denied that the moving
party's lawyer was intoxicated at the time of the
hearing and unable to present party's case.
The Utah Courts have consistently followed the
principles laid down by the Federal Courts in the
cases quoted above from early times up until the
present. This can be seen from the following quotations from the Utah Supreme Court:
On June 30, 1898, the Utah Supreme Court said
in Utah Commercial.and Savings Bank vs. Trumbo,
17 Utah 189, 53 Pac. 1033:
"The policy of the law is that every man shall have
his day in court before judgment shall be entered
against him, and where a judgment by default has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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been entered;· and within a proper time a good defense to the action in which the judgment was
entered was made to appear, the default will be
vacated, and the judgment set aside to permit trial
on the merits, or the circumstances which led to the
default are. such as to 'cause the court to hesitate, it
. is better to resove the doubt in favor of the application, so that a trialmay be secured on the merits."

On June 11, 1907, ·in the· case of Cutler vs. Hay· 2 Utah, 354, 90 Pac. 897, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed judgmerit.of the trial court because
it had abused its discretion in refusing to set aside
a verdict and said:
cock~'

"As has been weli said, in all doubtful cases the general rule of courts is to incline towards granting relief from default, and to bring about a judgment on
the merits. This rule, as appears from authorities,
is of almost universal application ... "

On this point see also Vol. L Black on Judgments,
Section 354; Cameron vs. CarrolL 67 Cal 500, 8 Pac.
45; Wolfe vs. Canadian Pacific Railroad, 89 Cal 332,·
26 Pac. 825; and Weston vs. S. F. & B. Ry. Co., 41 Cal
17;
In August of 1953, the Utah Court made the
statement ·in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company,
quoted earlier in this brief.
These principles of the Utah Court have been
affirmed right up to the present time, as can be seen
from the case of Echo Ney, Trustee, Wasatch Homes,
Inc. vs. G. T. Harrison and Alda J. Harrison, ______ Utah
________ 299 Pac. 2d J 14, decided in July of 1956. In that
case the Utah Court. cites 68-3-2, Utah Code AnnotatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ed 1953, which says that all Court cites 68-3-2, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which says that all provisions
are to be construed liberally with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
The Court further says in that case, "The statutory
authority has been liberally construed to the end
that there be trial on the merits beginning with our
earliest decisions." The Court then went on to reaffirm the opinion in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co.
In that particular case the Utah Court held that
eleven months after default judgment was rendered
was within a reasonable time requirement, as of
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
From the above citations and q1,.1.otations, the
following rules can be determined for a trial court
to follow in ruling under 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
l. Relief from judgments and orders is within
the discretion of the trial court. Echo Ney vs. Harrison, supra; Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 Pac 2d,
741; Utah Commercial & Savings Bank vs. Trumbo,
1898, 17 Utah 189 and 53 Pac. 1033; Cutler vs. Haycock, 1907, 32 Utah, 354, 90 Pac. 897.

2. This discretion should be used in the furtherance of justice and equity. Echo Ney vs. Harrison,
supra; Warren vs. Dixon Rancho Co., 260 Pac. 2d,
741; Commercial Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, 1898, 17
Utah 189, 53 Pac. 1033; Cutler vs. Haycock, 1907, 32
Utah 354, 90 Pac. 897.
3. The court favors trial of all causes of action
on their merits. Echo Ney vs. Harrison, supra; WarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reri vs. Dixon Ranch Co., supra; Utah Commercial
Savings Bank vs. Trumbo, supra; Cutler vs. Haycock, .supra; Assman vs. Fleming, 159 Fed. 2nd, 332,
10 F.R. Service, 60b, 25, Case 1. Tozar vs. Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., 179 Fed. 2nd, 242, 15 F.R. Service, 60b .24, Case l.
4. If a meritorious defense is shown and there
are no intervening equities, the court should be liberal in determining what is a justifiable excuse for
allowing a default to be taken. All of the above cases
cited hold this.

5. All do·uht which the court may have as to
whether or not a default judgme·nt sho·uld be set
aside should be resolved in favor of the defendant,
so that the trial of the case on its merits may be had.
(All cases cited above.)
6. Decisions of the trial court under Rule 60(b)
will not be upset by an appellate court, unless abuse
of discretion is clearly shown. Echo Ney vs. Harrison,
supra; Vvarren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., supra.
In accordance with these principles it can be
seen that the trial court did abuse its discretion. The
answer on. file in this case definitely and clearly
stated a defense to the action which was brought by
the plaintiff. The affidavit of defendanfs attorney
states that it was just a mistake and inadvertence
which caused that the answer was not filed within
the proper time, as defined by the rules. This case
ought to be tried on its merits. The court ought to
have evidence in front of it with which to determine
the issues of the· case; and no party would be done
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an injustice in having the case tried on its merits.
Under the facts, as before this court, the defendant
in this case would be done a complete injustice if
she were not allowed to present her side of the case
to the court. She, in accordance with the summons
served upon her, within the allowable time sent the
said summons to a licensed practicing attorney 01
Salt Lake County, which attorney had knowledge of
the defense which she had to the said case, and she
trusted the said attorney to represent her and protect
her interests, and give her a c h an c e to get into
court to present her defense to the case. The attorney, through inadvertence, failed to do this, but just
as soon as it was made known to the defendant, she
again called her attorney, and the attorney prepared
a motion to vacate and set aside the said judgment.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that in this present case that if justice
is to be done, the defendant should have her day
in court and be allowed to present her defense to
the case which plaintiff brought against her.
For these reasons, the District Court's failure to
set aside the default judgment should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted by:

NORMAN WADE

Attorney for Appellant
and Defendant.
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